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I. INTRODUCTION
The development of litigation alternatives in family law-most
notably, family mediation and the more recent emergence of
collaborative family law-is often heralded as the answer to the
miserable emotional, financial, and practical consequences of many
divorces. The costs of litigation, especially for children,1 are clearly
demonstrated by research and recognized by many disillusioned
lawyers. Some family lawyers speak with a distaste bordering on
ferocity about the negative consequences of litigation. Consider the
Copyright 2005, by LouIsIANA LAW REVIEW.
* Professor of Law University of Windsor Ontario. I am grateful to Bernie
Mayer and Roselle Wissler for their extremely helpful comments on an earlier draft
of this essay
1. See generally Robert E. Emery, Ph.D., Marriage, Divorce, and Children's
Adjustment (2d ed., Sage Publications 1999); Peter McCarthy et al., Longitudinal
Study of the Impact of Different Dispute Resolution Processes on Post-Divorce
Relationships between Parents and Children, Report to the Fund for Research on
Dispute Resolution (1992); J.B. Kelly, Children's Adjustment in Conflicted
Marriage and Divorce: A Decade Review of Research, 10 J. Child & Adolescent
Psychiatry 237 (2003).
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following comment from a family lawyer reflecting on twenty-five
years of practice experience: "In litigation, even if you got a good
legal result for the client.., at the end of it there is just depression
and ashes. It leaves more than a sour taste-it leaves a sickness in
the stomach of the client, and in mine too."2
The rights-based position-taking required by a litigation strategy
entrenches feelings of grievance and entitlement. Position-taking,
however justifiable, inevitably acts to polarize the parties and
escalates conflict. The resultant tensions can be deeply unsettling for
lawyers and clients alike. Such experiences led one experienced
litigator, himself in the process of divorce, to describe litigation as
the unleashing of "demons" who represent the dark side of human
nature: "[Litigation] feeds the demons raw meat and works them into
a frenzy... [it] provides a battalion of troops for vindication."3
Position-taking in litigation also tends to reduce creativity and the
capacity for accommodation. In this environment, winning takes on
a particular appearance and may overshadow a practical, acceptable
family transition. Even if winning is ultimately achieved, it may not
be all that was hoped for. Inevitably, emotional closure and recovery
are pushed further away in the process, often eroding any remaining
commitment to co-parenting.4 In civil trials, the process of resolution
may be prolonged yet further by the need for enforcement steps after
securing a favorable judgment. This may partly explain why, in this
author's 1995 study matching a control group of Ontario litigants
who went to trial with a group who mediated their dispute, only 8.5%
of trial group litigants described themselves as completely satisfied
with the outcome.5
This dismal record of the failures of the traditional litigation
model, especially in the family context where future parenting
relationships are often critical, suggests a strong case for rethinking
processes and procedures in order to reduce the negative
consequences of litigation while maintaining the protection of
vulnerable clients. But is redesigning how we approach litigation, for
example, by the introduction of new consensus-building processes
such as mediation and collaborative law, sufficient to change the
quality of the experience for litigants and its outcomes?
2. Julie Macfarlane, Experiences of Collaborative Law: Preliminary Results
from the Collaborative Lawyering Research Project, 2004 J. Disp. Resol. 179, 191
(2004).
3. Julie Macfarlane, The Emerging Phenomenon ofCollaborative Family Law
(CFL): A Qualitative Study of CFL Cases 22 (Dep't of Just. of Canada 2005).
4. This tendency is illustrated by the gradual withdrawal from the child's life
of the non-custodial parent. See generally Emery, supra note 1.
5. Julie Macfarlane, Court-Based Mediation in Civil Cases: An Evaluation of
the Toronto General Division ADR Centre 22 (1995) (on file with author).
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II. THE IMPETUS FOR PROCEDURAL REFORMS
The reliance on lawyer-to-lawyer negotiation to resolve the vast
majority of suits before trial appears at first glance to support the
assertion, made by many lawyers, that they are extremely effective
at settling cases. That is, until we look closely at just when and how
settlement usually takes place. Most settlement takes place either
shortly before trial or "on the courtroom steps." Of particular
concern are the delay in commencing serious negotiations until
significant resources have been expended6 and the restrictive,
depersonalized, and often inadequate character of negotiated
solutions.7 A further concern should be the apparently minimal
amount of time lawyers actually spend on negotiation, especially
when compared with their efforts to pursue litigation.8
Lawyers generally conduct litigation as if they are going to trial
but they almost never do.9 Research on the negotiating behaviors of
family lawyers,' personal injury specialists, 1 and commercial
litigators" demonstrates that lawyers practicing in these areas assume
they will ultimately settle almost all of their cases. However,
research also shows that the ritual opening "dance" (at least) of
lawyer-to-lawyer bargaining is dominated by hard-line positions
reflecting zero-sum assumptions which drive a culture of competition
and widespread expectations of zealous advocacy among both
6. Characteristically, following the discovery phase. See John L Barkai &
Gene Kassebaum, Using Court-AnnexedArbitration to Reduce Litigant Costs and
to Increase the Pace of Litigation, 16 Pepp. L. Rev. 43, 47 (1989); Julie
Macfarlane, Culture Change? A Tale of Two Cities and Mandatory Court-
Connected Mediation, 2002. J. Disp. Resol. 241, 291 (2002).
7. Settlements generally reflect anticipated likely outcomes, constitute merely
monetary solutions, and do little or nothing to repair commercial or domestic
relationships. See Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Lawyer Negotiations: Theories and
Realities-What We Learnfrom Mediation, 56 Mod. L. Rev. 361,369-71 (1993);
Carrie Menkel-Meadow, The Transformation of Disputes by Lawyers: What the
Dispute Paradigm Does and Does Not Tell Us, 1985 Mo. J. on Disp. Resol. 25,
33-34 (1985).
8. Herbet M. Kritzer, Let's Make A Deal: Understanding the Negotiation
Process in Ordinary Litigation 30-41 (Univ. of Wis. Press 1991).
9. The most recent study from 2002 shows that just 1.8% of all filings in
United States federal court proceed to trial, down from 11.5% in 1962. See
generally Marc Galanter, The Vanishing Trial: An Examination of Trials and
Related Matters in Federal and State Courts, 1 J. Empirical Legal Stud. 459 (2004).
10. See generally Lynn M. Mather, et al., Divorce Lawyers at Work: Varieties
of Professionalism in Practice (Oxford Univ. Press 2001).
11. See generally Hazel Genn, Hard Bargaining: Out of Court Settlement in
Personal Injury Actions (Clarendon Press 1988).
12. See generally Macfarlane, Culture Change, supra note 6.
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lawyers and clients. 13 The "double-think" involved in knowing that
a case will almost certainly settle but acting as if it will not is
variously explained by the need to present a strong or even
aggressive opening in order to obtain a good deal, 4 the need to
bolster one's reputation as a strong negotiator, 5 and the need to
frame every possible strategy within the "shadow of the law"' 6 that
may be the final arbiter of the conflict. These justifications sustain
and reinforce habits of negotiation that prefer to define a problem
according to legal issues, which are inevitably normative and
understood as either right or wrong positions.18
This importance of maintaining an appearance at least of
resistance to settlement extends (at the client's cost) into widespread
reluctance among practicing lawyers to even contemplate negotiation
until "everything" is known about the case,' 9 where information is
rarely offered up voluntarily and is sometimes withheld. The
consequent lack of knowledge about the other side's motivation,
goals, needs, or sincerity replays over and over again the defensive-
reactive dynamic of the Prisoner's Dilemma.2" These philosophic
and behavioral habits are further overlaid by a widespread yet
generally unstated conviction that any other approach to settlement
negotiation would defeat the current market economics of legal
practice. As one lawyer admitted: "[Mediation] kick[s] me squarely
in the pocket book, or not me because I have clients that want to fight
those big numbers, but . . . if you're being entirely selfish, just
looking at the lawyer's interest, then why do I want this?"'"
13. See generally Stevens H. Clarke et al., Court-Ordered Civil Case Mediation
in North Carolina: Court Efficiency and Litigant Satisfaction (Inst. of Gov't, Univ.
of N.C. 1996); Milton Heumann & Jonathan M. Hyman, Negotiation Methods and
Litigation Settlement Methods in New Jersey: "You Can 't Always Get What You
Want", 12 Ohio St. J. on Disp. Resol. 253, 261-65 (1997).
14. See generally Genn, supra note 11.
15. Id.
16. Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the
Law: The Case of Divorce, 88 Yale L.J. 950, 954-55 (1979).
17. See generally Heumann & Hyman, supra note 13.
18. See generally Julie Macfarlane, What Does the Changing Culture ofLegal
Practice Mean for Legal Education?, 20 Windsor Y.B. Access Just. 191 (2001).
19. Macfarlane, Culture Change, supra note 6, at 283.
20. The Prisoner's Dilemma occurs when one party takes a defensive-reactive
approach to negotiation (for example, concealing information, goals, and needs)
because, without information to the contrary, it must assume that the other party
will do likewise. Ronald J. Gilson & Robert H. Mnookin, Disputing Through
Agents: Cooperation and Conflict Between Lawyers in Litigation, 94 Colum. L.
Rev. 509, 514-15 (1994).
21. Macfarlane, Culture Change, supra note 6, at 283. The same lawyer, who
suggested that possibly ninety-seven percent of what lawyers did was "wasted,"
followed up this comment by musing about the hundred boxes of litigation material
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These assumptions about what it means to be an effective litigator
and negotiator result in a litigation culture in which settlement is
frequently understood as the manifestation of a "watered-down legal
system"2 rather than a skillful negotiation process which achieves
the clients' best interests. For a disconcerting number of litigators,
settlement is for "wimps:" "I would say to the client, if you're
interested in settlement, you go and talk to the other side about it, I'm
very bad at it. My job is to manage a war, not to manage a peace., 23
Not all lawyers approach settlement negotiations this way, but
enough do to produce a perception that, despite the small number of
cases that proceed to a full trial, a culture of adversarialism is on the
rise. This author's own research on commercial litigators found
many examples of lawyers who understood their role as highly
adversarial or, and this may be more important, believed that this was
the cultural expectation of them: "I'm known as a son of bitch. I'm
not afraid to go to trial. I won't cave in and go and settle. I have
clients who know that and don't mind losing. They want to fight, so
they expect me to be a son of a bitch.,
24
Professor Andrea Schneider's recreation of Gerald Williams's
pioneering research on how lawyers negotiate found, like Williams
did twenty-five years earlier, that lawyers self-describe a range of
negotiation styles, 25 including both "problem-solving" ("co-
operative" in Williams's original survey) and "adversarial"
("competitive" in Williams's survey).26 Schneider also found that
the number and the "nastiness" of "adversarial" lawyers in the sample
had increased. 7 She attributes this at least in part to the culture of
competition in law school and legal practice: "[G]iven the choice
between being too soft and too hard, most lawyers would opt for too
hard." 28
The complex and diverse culture of legal practice, impacted by
numerous factors such as area of practice, size of firm, and size of the
currently crowding his office. Thinking aloud, perhaps, he then asked the rhetorical
question: "But how am I am going to pay for the hundred boxes?" Id.
22. A comment repeated by a number of lawyers in the Culture Change
project. Unpublished data from Macfarlane, Culture Change, supra note 6.
23. Unpublished data from the Culture Change project, supra note 6 (on file
with author).
24. Macfarlane, Culture Change, supra note 6, at 302.
25. Andrea Kupfer Schneider, Shattering Negotiation Myths: Empirical
Evidence on the Effectiveness of Negotiation Style, 7 Harv. Negot. L. Rev. 143
(2002) (referencing Gerald R. Williams, Legal Negotiation and Settlement (West
Publishing 1983)).
26. Id. at 151-54, 163.
27. Id. at 189.
28. Id. at 146.
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local bar, and so on,29 inevitably makes generalizations about the rise
or fall of adversarialism contestable. What is less contentious is that
the sensitivity of the consuming public (especially institutional and
corporate clients) to exponentially rising legal costs has led to
demands for less costly and more efficient methods of dispute
resolution, demands that policy-makers have begun to respond to via
procedural reforms. An increasing appetite for early reporting,
strategic settlement planning, and early dispute resolution has been
noted in relationships between commercial lawyers and their
institutional clients (for example, financial institutions and insurance
companies).3" Sophisticated commercial clients, especially repeat
players, may generally be less prepared to be passive and more
inclined to assert their wishes. Sometimes, this is attributed to the
increasing influence of in-house counsel, who are obliged to account
for and justify all litigation expenditures to their managers.3
Litigators themselves are noticing the change in approach among
many of their commercial clients. As one expressed it, "[T]he old
'just fight-at-all-costs and don't look at it [the legal bill], don't even
think about an approach [opening negotiations],' [that attitude] just
doesn't seem to exist anymore."
Whatever the current state of adversarialism in the legal
profession, policy-makers have become extremely concerned about
the economic efficiency of a model that settles almost every case but
not until after a significant expenditure of time and resources, both
public and private. Settlement "on the courthouse steps" means
backlogs and delays in court systems and dissatisfied litigants. Civil
justice reform to compensate or counteract this bargaining culture
has concentrated on encouraging earlier settlement via a range of
institutionalized processes. Attention to the structure of the conflict
resolution process-timelines, opportunities for negotiation,
encouragement to exchange party information in private, off-the-
record meetings-has dominated this agenda in North America for
at least two decades. We now have court-connected mediation and
arbitration programs, case management systems, increased use of
settlement conferencing and pre-trial procedures, and a myriad of
29. Described generally as "communities ofpractice" in Mather, supra note 10,
at ch. 3. In earlier work, this notion has been described as "local legal culture."
Thomas W. Church, Jr., ExaminingLocal Legal Culture, Am. B. Found. Res. J. 449(1985).
30. Macfarlane Culture Change, supra note 6, at 293-95.
31. See generally Craig A. McEwen, Managing Corporate Disputing, 14 Ohio
J. Disp. Resol. 1 (1998).
32. Unpublished data from Macfarlane, Culture Change, supra note 6 (on file
with author).
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private counseling, support, and advocacy services that operate
outside the formal court system.
Reflecting the disillusionment of some practitioners with the
deficiencies of the litigation system, professional practice initiatives
have also emerged outside the court system, including collaborative
and co-operative lawyering networks and movements such as
therapeutic jurisprudence and holistic law.33 While the institutional
initiatives generally have efficiency objectives (i.e., to reduce or clear
the backlog), the voluntary innovations tend to reflect the goals of
practitioners to develop more personally satisfying ways of serving
clients.34
In summary, there is plentiful evidence of a widespread
perception (at least outside the legal profession) of the need for
faster, less costly, and more humane methods of conflict resolution
that can produce efficacious results. The larger question this essay
will explore is how far can procedural initiatives and innovations
contribute to real change in conflict resolution processes and
outcomes?
1I. THE CONSEQUENCES OF PROCEDURAL REFORM
After twenty years of experimentation, there is by now a
significant body of data examining the results of procedural justice
reforms. In many cases, court-based procedural reform has been
shown to increase the rate of earlier settlements.35 Satisfaction
among clients with mediation and other settlement-oriented
initiatives is generally high.36 Similarly, studies of private mediation
and now collaborative law settings also show consistently high levels
of client satisfaction.37 Interestingly, the evidence for enhanced party
relationships, more durable outcomes, and other qualitative measures
33. See generally Nancy J. Cameron, Collaborative Practice: Deepening the
Dialogue (Continuing Legal Educ. Soc'y of B.C. 2004); Leonard L. Riskin, The
Contemplative Lawyer: On the Potential Contributions of Mindfulness Mediation
to Law Students, Lawyers, and Their Clients, 7 Harv. Negot. L. Rev. 1 (2002);
Pauline H. Tesler, Collaborative Law: A New Paradigm For Divorce Lawyers, 5
Psychol. Pub. Pol'y & L. 967 (1999); David Wexler, Therapeutic Jurisprudence:
An Overview, 17 T.M. Cooley L. Rev. 125 (2000).
34. Macfarlane, Experiences of Collaborative Law, supra note 2, at 194-216.
35. See generally Robert Hann & Carl Barr, Evaluation of the Ontario
Mandatory Mediation Program (Rule 24.1): Final Report-The First 23 Months
(Ont. Ministry of the Attorney-General Queens Printer 2001); Roselle L. Wissler,
The Effectiveness of Court-Connected Dispute Resolution in Civil Cases, 22
Conflict Resolution Quarterly 55 (2004).
36. See generally Wissler, Effectiveness, supra note 35.
37. See generally Macfarlane, Experiences of Collaborative Law, supra note
2005] 1493
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is more mixed,38 as is the causal connection between program design
(for instance, how mediators are selected and voluntary or mandatory
referrals into programs).39 One way to summarize what we do know
so far about the impact of procedural innovations and changes is that
they appear to be largely if not uniformly successful along several
baseline indicators: higher and earlier rates of settlement and general
client satisfaction with both the process and the third party mediator.
It is less clear, however, that the introduction of new procedures and
practice models is creating systemic and fundamental changes in
lawyers' attitudes towards negotiation and negotiated outcomes, the
consideration of non-legal factors in developing settlements, and the
genuine inclusion of clients in formulating outcomes.4"
It is changes like these, however, that are critical to the
reorientation of litigation to the expeditious pursuit of just and
appropriate settlement. Changing the processes without changing
lawyers' attitudes and supporting the development of appropriate new
legal skills will only get us partway to the goals described earlier:
faster, cheaper, more humane conflict resolution with constructive
and practicable results. Similarly, changing procedures without
persuading lawyers of the need to adapt their traditional skills to a
new environment of settlement advocacy creates tension and
resistance, not real change. Systemic change has implications for the
fundamental character of legal expertise and skills-what it means
for a lawyer to be an effective conflict advocate and conflict resolver.
It means challenging the profession's dominant ideology of conflict,
the idea that victory is to be achieved at all costs and that disputes are
always morally justified arguments. It means reevaluating the nature
of the lawyer/client relationship and the types of outcomes that are
legitimately sought and valued.
If this depth of change is what we want, we cannot assume that
redesigning our existing conflict resolution processes is going to get
us there in a single leap. The impact of procedures aimed at
encouraging settlement cannot be understood in isolation from the
cultural and attitudinal environment that surrounds the "business" of
litigation. Law is a business and for the last twenty years it has come
38. Wissler, Effectiveness, supra note 35; Roselle L. Wissler, Court-Connected
Mediation in General Civil Cases: What We Know from Empirical Research 17
Ohio J. Disp. Resol. 641 (2002).
39. Wissler, Court-Connected Mediation, supra note 38, at 674-81.
40. Evidence indicates that lawyers still dominate mediation and generally
minimize their client's contribution. Nancy A. Welsh, Making Deals in Court-
Connected Mediation: What's Justice Got to Do With It?, 79 Wash. U. L.Q. 787,
788 (2001); Nancy A. Welsh, The Thinning Vision ofSelf-Determination in Court-
Connected Mediation: The Inevitable Price ofInstitutionalization?, 6 Harv. Negot.
L. Rev. 1 (2001). But see, e.g., Macfarlane, Culture Change, supra note 6.
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increasingly to be built on the foundation of the billable hour.
Lawyers need to feel comfortable that they can continue to make a
living if they adapt their practice to embrace new settlement
processes. This is a radical departure from the conventional
"business" of settlement negotiation, which comes later in the life of
most files, is limited to interaction between the lawyers themselves,
and is thus far less likely to involve clients, judges, or other third
parties.
The superficiality of procedural reforms that do not take root in
lawyers' attitudes and skills and are not demonstrably viable in
business terms is illustrated by the impact that lawyers have on
litigants' experiences of new processes. While there is some
evidence that lawyers can be highly effective and constructive in
mediation when they are fully supportive of such an approach,41 there
is also abundant evidence that they can frustrate and undermine the
process.42 Research data confirms what has long been suspected, that
lawyers still control the settlement process, including the degree of
preparation, how serious they are about negotiation, how far if at all
they involve their clients in the settlement process, and how the
bargaining dynamic actually plays out. In a recent study by this
author of the impact of a decade-long mandatory mediation program
in Saskatchewan,43 the impact of lawyer attitudes on client
expectations and experiences of mediation was strikingly clear.
Where counsel was positive about using the mediation process, their
clients had a good and constructive experience." Where counsel
were negative and ill-prepared, their clients went into mediation
unaware of the purpose of the session and unready to settle.45 A
number of clients complained that the primary factor thwarting
settlement was the adversarial approach of their own or both
lawyers.46  Other lawyers described how they resist client
involvement in mediation by coaching their clients in advance to
remain silent ("I teach them to shut-up."). '" These reports were
41. See generally Craig A. McEwen et al., Bring in the Lawyers: Challenging
the Dominant Approaches to Ensuring Fairness in Divorce Mediation, 79 Minn. L.
Rev. 1317 (1995).
42. Kimberlee K. Kovach & Lela P. Love, Mapping Mediation: The Risks of
Riskin's Grid, 3 Harv. Negot. L. Rev. 71, 96 (1998); Welsh, Making Deals, supra
note 40, at 795-804; see also Macfarlane, Culture Change, supra note 6.
43. Julie Macfarlane & Michaela Keet, Civil Justice Reform and Mandatory
Civil Mediation in Saskatchewan: Lessons from a Maturing Program, 42 Alberta
L. Rev. 677, 691-93 (2005).
44. Id. at 691-92.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 691-93.
47. Macfarlane, Culture Change, supra note 6, at 275.
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confirmed by many clients.48 Settlement efforts require good faith
and, given lawyer influence over their clients, it is easy to turn the
claim that these processes are a waste of time into a self-fulfilling
prophecy. Given that procedural reform challenges a lawyer's
autonomy and is generally not the lawyer's idea in the first place, the
persistence of this resistance should not be surprising.
Litigation is essentially disputing carried out by agents.49 As the
agents, lawyers remain the dominant players in the adversary
system.50 These agents and their professional cultures exert a
powerful control over the norms and expectations5 of civil disputing.
When procedural reform does not capture the hearts and minds of the
legal profession, it is frequently re-assimilated into old familiar
process models and outcomes. This is not limited to the lawyer's
influence over his client. Other documented strategies include
belittling mediators and other "softies" (colleagues who support
mediation), using mediation and settlement conferencing to obtain a
strategic advantage (such as informal discovery) rather than intending
to settle, and "going through the motions" by showing up yet being
totally unprepared to negotiate. Toronto lawyers talk about the
"twenty minute mediation" where they attend mandatory mediation
without any preparation or intention of serious negotiation.52 Also in
Toronto, lawyers boasted openly about defeating the random
assignment case management system that existed in the mid-1990s
by closing a file selected for case management, then re-filing in the
hope of escaping assignment.5 3 The creative capacity of lawyers to
develop ways to frustrate the purpose of mandatory settlement
procedures when they are convinced the procedures will not be
helpful to their own analysis of a case is apparently boundless.
Despite these inherent limitations, procedural reforms have
achieved some important results. The most important of these is the
exposure of the legal profession and its clients to alternative
processes for resolving cases that are by now demonstrably effective
in settling contentious matters earlier than traditional negotiation
interventions, and often with fewer negative consequences (to both
relationships and pocketbooks) for commercial and domestic clients
alike. Moreover, procedural reforms are here to stay. Despite
continued debates over mandatory requirements, the role of judges
48. Macfarlane & Keet, supra note 43, at 691-93.
49. See generally Gilson & Mnookin, supra note 20.
50. Jacqueline M. Nolan-Haley, Lawyers, Clients and Mediation, 73 Notre
Dame L. Rev. 1369, 1372 (1998).
51. See generally Richard Miller & Austin Sarat, Grievances, Claims and
Disputes: Assessing the Adversary Culture, 15 Law & Soc'y Rev. 525 (1980-81).
52. Macfarlane, Culture Change, supra note 6, at 263, 268.
53. Id. at 263.
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versus third party mediators, and resistance by some parts of the legal
profession, policy-makers now have sufficient evidence to convince
them that institutionalizing settlement-oriented processes is a strategy
capable of producing the desired results of shorter dispute timelines
and higher settlement rates.54
Procedural reforms are a necessary but insufficient element of
long term and systemic change to dispute resolution processes. Real
change requires changes in attitudes about the nature of effective
advocacy and conflict resolution and the parallel development of new
skills. Procedural change can support and reinforce systemic change,
however, and from the experiences of the last twenty years, we can
uncover important lessoas in how system redesigns might eventually
translate into systemic change in lawyers' skills and attitudes.
IV. BUILDING ON PROCEDURAL REFORM TO CREATE SYSTEMIC
CHANGE
What then can we learn from procedural reform about creating
systemic change in dispute resolution processes and outcomes?
A. The Relationship Between Changing Behaviors and Changing
Attitudes
First, while changing the process does not in itself change
attitudes, there may be a longer-term relationship between process
and attitude change. In the same way as mediation can secure
behavioral undertakings but not necessarily change minds and hearts,
the value of changing process, or behavioral, expectations is that this
may begin to change the normative values associated with the process
or behavior. For example, if management and labor representatives
agree to a process for consultation and the raising of issues, over
time, labor-management communication will likely increase and be
enhanced. In the family context, if co-parents agree not to speak
poorly of one another in front of the children and each keeps their
word, over time the idea of doing anything other than this begins to
appear inappropriate. Thus, engaging in a particular, well-defined
mode of behavior has the capacity to both normalize that mode and
enable those affected to experience a different and hopefully
constructive alternative to the old behaviors.
54. However, the debate over whether adjudication is simply being diverted to
earlier stages through the increased use of motions and other pre-trial applications
is only just beginning. See generally Gillian K. Hadfield, Where Have All the
Trials Gone? Settlements, Non-Trial Adjudications and Statistical Artifacts in the
Changing Disposition of Federal Civil Cases, 1 J. Empirical Legal Stud. 705
(2004).
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Similarly, research evidence suggests that lawyers' attitudes
towards mediation become more positive with time and as a result of
repeated experiences with it.55 John Lande's work suggests that what
he describes as lawyers' "faith"5 6 in mediation increases with
exposure to the process.57 A study of Indiana lawyers reached the
conclusion that favorable attitudes towards mediation correlate
significantly with mediation experience as a representative.58 This
author's "Culture Change" study has found evidence to suggest that
attitudes towards mediation become more positive with greater
experience and familiarity with the process. 59 A recent evaluation of
the Saskatchewan program also uncovered numerous testaments from
lawyers who described themselves as being resistant to the
legislature's introduction of mandatory mediation in 1994, only to
have changed their views over time.6' A number of lawyers gave
personal accounts of what was sometimes described as their
"conversion ' '61 to the usefulness of mediation in civil dispute
settlement. Even some senior practitioners explained a shift in their
strategy and attitudes towards settlement as the result of pragmatism
and experience. As one experienced lawyer stoically put it, "[W]hen
you practice long enough, you'll understand there are some brilliant
legal arguments that are not worth making.,
62
Similar changes over time are also illustrated in data on changes
in lawyer/client relationships in settlement processes. The
requirement that clients attend mediation and settlement conferences
despite the fact that many lawyers are able to effectively sideline
their clients' genuine participation 63 nonetheless threatens counsel
accustomed to conducting discussions with other lawyers and
sometimes with a judge, but without their client present. Working
with the client present rather than holding him or her at arm's length
55. See generally McEwen et al., Bring in the Lawyers, supra note 41; Roselle
L. Wissler, When Does Familiarity Breed Content? A Study ofthe Role ofDifferent
Forms ofADR Education and Experience in Attorneys 'ADR Recommendations, 2
Pepp. Disp. Resol. L.J. 199 (2002).
56. John Lande, Getting the Faith: Why Business Lawyers and Executives
Believe in Mediation, 5 Harv. Negot. L. Rev. 137, 199 (2000).
57. Id. at 171-176; see also McEwen, Managing Corporate Disputing, supra
note 31.
58. Morris L. Medley & James A. Schellenberg, Attitudes ofAttorneys Toward
Mediation, 12 Mediation Q. 185, 195-96 (1994).
59. Macfarlane, Culture Change, supra note 6.
60. Macfarlane & Keet, supra note 43.
61. Id. at 688-89.
62. Julie Macfarlane & Michaela Keet, Learning from Experience: An
Evaluation of the Saskatchewan Queens Bench Mediation Program, 2003 Sask.
Just. Disp. Resol. 19, 28 (2003).
63. See Welsh, Making Deals, supra note 40, at 838-46.
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from negotiation is unfamiliar to most lawyers and requires
significant adjustment. This appears to occur over time, with many
lawyers who are experienced in mediation attesting to the benefits of
involving clients in the negotiations. One lawyer, who now described
himself as now very comfortable involving clients in the mediation
process, frankly described his early experiences as follows:
It completely caught me off guard at first. The first few
mediations, I hadn't had any mediation training. My only
training was the general attitude in the profession that this is
a lot of horse crap and I had settlements hit me between the
eyes and I couldn't believe my clients sold out on me the way
they did. I was concerned that I had a serious client control
problem.6
Social psychologists have long posited a dynamic relationship
between changing behaviors and changing attitudes.65 Of course,
neither operates in a vacuum. Even relatively positive attitudes can
be further undermined by other economic and cultural factors which
may act as barriers to change, for example, the dominance of a
positional approach to bargaining, and other entrenched habits of
action and mind.66 At minimum, these other factors probably operate
to reduce the amount of real change in habits of action and mind and
increase the degree to which change is assimilated into old behaviors
with only slight adjustments (for example, when lawyers attend
mediation but simply, "go through the motions").67 It seems to be a
reasonable assertion, however, based on data on how lawyers respond
to exposure to mediation, that changing behavioral practices, even
coercively, allows for a new and different experience, which, if
positive, may change lawyers' attitudes. This remains the strongest
argument for at least a limited period and/or scope of mandatory
mediation processes.68
64. Macfarlane, Culture Change, supra note 6, at 30.
65. That is, behavior is not determinative of attitudes, nor vice versa. See, e.g.,
Michael J. Saks & Edward Krupat, Social Psychology and Its Applications,
197-198 (Harper & Row 1988). However, dissonance theory also suggests that we
try to reduce the dissonance between our behavior and our attitudes in order to
avoid the discomfort this produces. L. Festinger, A Theory of Cognitive
Dissonance (Stanford Univ. Press 1957).
66. See generally Heumann & Hyman, supra note 13.
67. Julie Macfarlane, When Cultures Collide, in Intercultural Dispute
Resolution in Aboriginal Contexts: Canadian and International Perspectives
(Catherine Bell & David Kahane, eds., Univ. of B.C. Press, 2004) (suggesting that
the meeting of two different dispute resolution cultures (litigation and consensus-
seeking) could result in assimilation, divergence, or convergence).
68. For a policy proposal on the appropriate use of mandatory processes to
encourage consensus-building and settlement, see Transforming Relationships
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B. Changing the Norms of Legitimacy
Part of the problem with simply requiring counsel (along with
their clients) to engage in different procedural steps is that there is
often no supporting culture of legitimacy within the profession for
engaging seriously with these processes. Decisions on procedural
reform are usually made by policy-makers (court administrators) or
legislatures. Occasionally, the legal profession participates in such
decisions through bar association working groups or consultative
bodies.69 Quite often, though, the legal profession finds itself facing
major procedural change with little or no consultation or opportunity
for input. Many lawyers feel their sense of personal autonomy keenly
and resent being dictated to by courts or legislatures. This feeling
may persist even where counsel feels positively about, or is at least
resigned to, new procedural requirements such as case management
and mandatory mediation. Articulating the sentiments of many, one
lawyer put it: "I feel like there's somebody out there, the thought's
almost paranoid, who is calling the shots.""
While legislators and policy-makers may reflect the legitimate
aspirations of legal consumers for faster and less costly legal
services, the reforms they propose impact a quite separate area of
professional expertise. What legislators and policy-makers do not
take into account is that the status of the legal profession, including
each professional relationship between lawyer and client, is founded
on the lawyer's claim to superior knowledge. This means that if
counsel tells his or her client that mediation is a waste of time, that
collaborative law is for softies, or not to worry about attending the
settlement conference, their expertise is assumed and accepted.
Where this expertise appears to run counter to government
requirements, it is easy for counsel to debase the requirements as
government interference rather than sound public policy.
The challenge is to create credibility and legitimacy for new
conflict processes within the legal profession itself. The norms that
will be changed as a result encompass both community and personal
values. The following statement by an Ottawa lawyer makes this
point perfectly: "Good lawyers, in this town, understand what
Through Participatory Justice 161 (Law Comm'n of Canada 2004). See infra
discussion Part 4(c).
69. For example, the Ontario Civil Rules Committee, consisting of
representatives of government, the bar association, the judiciary, and the public,
developed and approved a new rule of procedure for mandatory mediation in that
city. Available at http://ontariocourts.on.ca/superiorcourtjustice/
casemanagement/newsletter/2001/april2001 .htm.
70. Macfarlane, Culture Change, supra note 6, at 280.
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mediation's about... I think that's what is accepted in the system, so
lawyers have made the change."'"
Lawyers who choose to practice in a settlement advocacy model
(for example, the collaborative lawyers and those who promote "co-
operative negotiation protocols"7 2), along with those who would
describe themselves as "mediation believers,"73 have already made
the shift in their personal norms and values, but they still need to find
a supportive community to work within. A personal reputation for
collaboration becomes a valuable resource where a critical mass
within the community has embraced collaborative settlement
processes as mainstream and reflective of good lawyering. Similarly,
once the skills associated with effective settlement advocacy become
recognized as a commodity having positive economic and
reputational consequences, members of the legal profession will buy
into what they regard as a significant means of ensuring their
continued professional status.74
The question of critical mass has an important practical
dimension. At what point do lawyers in a community find
themselves regularly facing opponents who have a similar level of
skill and commitment to engaging in serious settlement processes?
Many lawyers describe the frustrations of negotiation sessions
reverting to the lowest common denominator, that is, if the lawyer on
the other side is poorly prepared, unskilled, and unwilling to take the
negotiation process seriously, they cannot gain traction.75 Frustration
with the predominance of settlement-adverse lawyers in their
community has led collaborative family lawyers to form their own
networks, which overnight provide critical mass for their alternative
processes.76
Outside voluntary networks of like-minded lawyers, it is
intriguing to ask how a "critical mass" of support for settlement
processes can be achieved. One route is to force exposure using one
hundred percent mandatory processes, hoping that the experience will
produce some converts, but this also has some negative
consequences, which shall be discussed below. Another approach is
to identify the most influential players in the wider legal community
71. Id. at 316.
72. John Lande, Evading Evasion: How Protocols Can Improve Civil Case
Results, 21 Alternatives to High Cost Litig. 149 (2003) (discussing co-operative
protocols).
73. Macfarlane, Culture Change, supra note 6, at 256.
74. See generally Richard L. Abel, American Lawyers (Oxford Univ. Press,
reprint ed. 1991).
75. Macfarlane & Keet, supra note 43, at 689-90.
76. See generally Macfarlane, Experiences of Collaborative Law, supra note
2; Macfarlane, Emerging Phenomenon, supra note 3.
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and look to them to play a leadership role. This includes members of
the judiciary7 but also seasoned litigators. The experiences of Ottawa
and Toronto with mandatory mediation provide for an interesting
comparison. In Toronto, there are some professional leaders
committed to mediation, but they are fewer and less powerful than
their compatriots in Ottawa." This is reflected in peer group norms
in Toronto, where it is still not fashionable for top-flight litigators to
vocally support mediation, and certainly not a mandatory mediation
program. In contrast, the widespread acceptance of mandatory
meuldaiun in Ottawa is such that lawyers wish to be seen as
supportive of such a positively regarded development.8 ' The
Saskatchewan legal community, described by one respondent as
originally "dragged into this kicking and screaming,"8' also appears
to have shifted in its core attitudes towards the use of mediation. As
one lawyer put it, "mediation is no longer a dirty word., 82 Thus,
getting the leadership of the bar and bench behind procedural change
appears to have a significant impact on the efficacy of such reforms.
It may also be that "critical mass" can be reached faster in smaller
communities where the legal culture or "community of practice"8 3 is
more cohesive, with stronger prevailing norms, and a relatively
homogeneous client base.
C. Voluntarism Versus Mandated Processes
Whereas repeated experiences of mediation and other similar
settlement-oriented processes can and apparently do make a
difference, also significant is the extent to which lawyers choose new
processes rather than having them imposed upon them.84 Again, a
77. Roselle L. Wissler, Barriers to Attorneys 'Discussion and Use ofADR, 19
Ohio St. J. on Disp. Resol. 459, 488-89 (2004).
78. Macfarlane, Culture Change, supra note 6, at 313-18.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Macfarlane & Keet, supra note 43, at 688.
82. Id.
83. This point may also apply to the development of voluntary networks. For
example, in Medicine Hat, Alberta (population 51,000), the two most prominent
members of the local family law bar (consisting of eighteen lawyers) attended
training for collaborative law in the late 1990s. They returned inspired and began
a collaborative lawyering group for family lawyers. Within a year, all but one of
the members of the local family law bar had joined up. Not practicing
collaboratively is now considered counter-culture in Medicine Hat. Mather, supra
note 10, at ch. 3.
84. The fact that we often adjust our attitudes to fit our behavior (often
explained by dissonance theory, see supra text accompanying note 65) can also be
explained by self-perception theory. According to this theory, in forming our
attitudes, we draw inferences from our behavior and the circumstances under which
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comparison between the phenomenon of collaborative family
lawyering and court-connected mandatory mediation is helpful here.
Rather than being imposed on them by policy-makers, collaborative
family lawyering has been created by lawyers themselves and comes
out of their experiences and disappointments with the litigation
model. Collaborative family law, in which negotiation replaces
litigation and the expertise of other professionals is integrated into
problem-solving and resolution, is therefore offered by lawyers who
have already significantly refrained their conceptions of effective
process and good outcomes in family conflict. Rather than being
pressured by their clients into finding less costly and time-consuming
alternatives to litigation, the desire of collaborative lawyers for
systemic change in the way divorce is handled may outpace the
appetites of their clients.
It seems obvious that where lawyers choose to practice in a
different way, for example, by committing to collaboration, they will
anticipate and promote systemic change faster and more dramatically
than where the justice system imposes a requirement on the legal
community. The motivation is different and the goals are more
personal and far-reaching. Many collaborative lawyers describe
embracing collaborative law as enabling a synthesis between their
personal and professional values, which is important to them and
which they had not experienced with traditional litigation practice.86
In a sense, this is a process of uncovering and embracing a new
professional identity. This is not simply a choice about better client
service, such as lowering fees, increasing hours of availability, or
offering additional services, but for most collaborative lawyers, it is
a decision to radically reshape the way they approach practice.87
While one can safely assume that voluntary adoption of process
innovation reflects a personal choice already made for change,
it occurs. If we are compelled to do something, we are not likely to infer that we
did it because we had favorable attitudes toward it. See, e.g., D.J. Bern, Self-
Perception Theory, in Advances in Experimental Social Psychology, Vol. 6
(Leonard Berkowitz ed., 1972).
85. The phenomenal recent growth of collaborative family lawyering groups
throughout North America has not yet been matched by client demand. Macfarlane,
Emerging Phenomenon, supra note 3, at 17-21.
86. Id. at 23-37.
87. However, skepticism about collaborative law has been expressed by some
who suspect it to be a way for mediocre family lawyers to recreate themselves as
a new form of "specialist," thus garnering an enhanced public profile and new
clients. However, this author's 2000-2003 study of collaborative lawyering in
Canada and the United States found a widespread authentic commitment at the
basis of individual decisions to practice collaboratively. See Macfarlane, Emerging
Phenomenon, supra note 3, at 17-21 (value realignment), 29-34 (bargaining
dynamics), 41-48 (advocacy and client control).
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mandatory processes seem to be able to produce some of the same
types of change, at least over the mid to long term. A number of
studies of mandatory processes show similar reframing and
reorientation among many lawyers, although these inevitably are
more gradual and less widespread than among a self-selected group.88
Research also shows relatively little difference in settlement rates
between voluntarily referred cases and those mandated into
mediation.89 Other mandatory programs fare less well in winning the
hearts and minds of participating counsel.9 °
There are lessons to be gleaned from the varied experiences of
mandatory programs and also from voluntary collaboration
arrangements. A significant factor in enhancing commitment to
mediation and other settlement processes seems to be offering
counsel some flexibility and choices within the framework of a
mandatory program. For example, allowing counsel some discretion
to decide when cases come to mediation (by making procedures to
apply for adjournment easily accessible and user-friendly), offering
counsel a choice of mediator, and even exempting certain types of
cases from mandatory requirements would reduce some of the
resistance and enable counsel to take some responsibility for making
good judgments about these questions.
There are also lessons about ensuring the necessary threshold
conditions within which a constructive negotiation is able to take
place. One of these is that the parties are each in receipt of adequate,
if not complete, information from which to seriously conduct
bargaining. In mandatory settlement processes which do not stipulate
requirements for prior exchange of documents and other relevant
information (and most mandatory mediation programs have minimal
requirements in this respect), there is often an unevenness of
openness between the two sides that makes meaningful negotiation
88. See generally Macfarlane, Culture Change, supra note 6 (commercial
litigators in Ottawa); Macfarlane & Keet, supra note 43 (civil litigators in
Saskatchewan); McEwen et al., Lawyers, Mediation and the Management of
Divorce Practice, 28 Law & Soc'y Rev. 149 (1994) (divorce lawyers in Maine).
89. Wissler, Effectiveness, supra note 35, at 69. Some studies, however, have
found small differences in settlement rates between voluntary and mandatory
referrals. See Craig A. McEwen, An Evaluation of the ADR Pilot Project, 7 ME.
B.J. 310 (1992).
90. For example, the Toronto data in the Culture Change project reflected a far
more negative and instrumentalist view of mandatory mediation. See supra note
6, at 313-19. Roselle L. Wissler's study of Ohio's court-mandated mediation
programs found that lawyers who request mediation, rather than having it imposed
upon them, form somewhat more favorable assessments of the process. However
their clients' views are unaffected by whether their cases are referred voluntarily
or mandated into mediation. See Wissler, Court-Connected Mediation in Civil
Cases, supra note 38.
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and collaboration much more difficult, or provides a ready excuse for
not taking the process seriously. One way that institutionalized
processes can learn from voluntary innovations such as collaborative
law, where the collaborative retainer agreement stipulates a shared
commitment to disclose all relevant information during the
negotiations, is that the predetermination of responsibilities for
information exchange is probably critical to a useful and constructive
bargaining session. Some lawyers participating in mandatory
programs are developing their own conventions on this, for example,
in Toronto and Ottawa, it is not required but is becoming increasingly
expected that each side will provide an affidavit of documents prior
to mediation.9' Following our 2004 evaluation of the Saskatchewan
mandatory mediation program, we recommended the transformation
of this informal practice (which was evident in smaller communities
such as Prince Alberta) into a formal requirement for the whole
program.92
D. The "Skills Gap"
Despite an explosion of mediation and ADR training for lawyers,
judges, and third party participants, there is still a dominant
assumption among members of the legal profession that participating
in the new settlement processes does not require them to acquire any
new skills. These types of courses, both in law schools and offered
commercially in continuing legal education programs, emphasize the
role of the lawyer as mediator and rarely focus in any depth on the
role of the lawyer as a representative in mediation and other
settlement processes. Several books have been published over the
last ten years on "mediation advocacy,"93 but the dearth of writing
and training in this area speaks for itself. There are complex and
sophisticated skills involved in acting as a lawyer-advocate in a
settlement-oriented process, and our current state of knowledge about
these skills and how to enhance them is as yet quite
underdeveloped.94 There is sometimes an equally unhelpful
assumption that what is fashionably described as a "paradigm shift"
(the move towards interests-based dispute resolution in negotiation
settings) requires lawyers to diminish or even abandon their advocacy
91. Macfarlane & Keet, supra note 43 at 689-90
92. Macfarlane & Keet, Learning from Experience, supra note 62, at 52-53;
Macfarlane & Keet, Civil Justice Reform, supra note 43, at 697.
93. See generally John W. Cooley, Mediation Advocacy (Nat'l Inst. for Trial
Advoc., 2d ed. 2002); Cinnie Noble et al., Mediation Advocacy: Effective Client
Representation in Mediation Proceedings (Emond Montgomery Publications 1998).
94. Macfarlane, Changing Culture, supra note 18.
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skills and engage in a complete re-education.95 While the skillful and
effective representation of clients in settlement-oriented processes
requires significant and challenging new habits of action and
thought,96 these can be built on the traditional advocacy skills of
lawyers in developing a new, more client-inclusive, interests-
oriented, collaborative, and pragmatic model of client service.
The strength of the argument for "retooling" lawyers in this way
is, of course, directly related to the perceived legitimacy of settlement
processes. Where mandatory mediation and other institutional
processes are regarded as an irrelevant nuisance, lawyers will be
unconcerned about acquiring any new skills and knowledge; they will
not even recognize that any new skills and knowledge are needed.
Even lawyers who are relatively positive about participating in new
settlement processes often fail to recognize that they require any new
strategies, tools, or skills. Others acknowledge only superficial and
often highly instrumental new skills, for example, assuming the
persona of "Miss Helpful," who shows a (fake) friendly and helpful
front in mediation.97 As these processes become more mainstream
and accepted, the expectation of skillful performance, and its market
value, goes up. Law firms and individual lawyers begin to market
themselves as mediation or ADR "specialists" as this becomes a
valuable commodity.98
There are also increasing numbers of lawyers who, while
originally exposed to mediation and settlement conferences as a
result of mandatory requirements, have come to reframe their
required skills as a result of their experiences in those processes.
What is most interesting about these types of comments is that they
describe learning and retooling which flows directly from a "need to
know."99 Having been "thrown into" mediation or similar processes,
and discovering that these processes often offered a genuine
opportunity for advancing client interests, these lawyers found they
needed to develop different types of approaches in order to do an
effective job for their clients. For example, one noted that:
My role has significantly changed and now I don't think a
litigator can be a litigator without also being a... person who
has advocacy skills relevant to conducting the process of
mediation... [H]ow do you do an opening statement? How
do you identify issues? How do you know to prepare yourself
95. See P.H. Tesler, Collaborative Law: A New Paradigm for Divorce
Lawyers, 6 Psychol., Pub. Pol'y, and Law, 951-66 (March 2000).
96. See generally Heumann & Hyman, supra note 13.
97. Macfarlane, Culture Change, supra note 6, at 299.
98. See generally Abel, supra note 74.
99. Macfarlane, Emerging Phenomenon, supra note 3, at 34-36.
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into what issues you want to give up? What issues do you
want to hold on to? How do you best present your client's
case? All of those things are done quite differently at the
mediation (this author's italics) because the adversarial
process to a large extent has been dropped... [N]ow instead
of coming in as an aggressive advocate saying I'm going to
take you to court, you've got to come somewhat conciliatory
because you are there to settle.'00
The "skills gap" will be an issue for the next generation of
lawyers, whether or not they come to settlement processes voluntarily
or via mandatory requirements. The "gap" is, of course, not
effectively closed simply by the voluntary adoption of settlement
processes. Even where lawyers voluntarily choose to embrace new
processes and pay for and attend skills training, their competence is,
of course, not guaranteed. Sometimes the zeal of collaborative
lawyers for their chosen process outstrips their competence, as where
their clients complain of the limits of their lawyers' abilities to
contain and manage high-conflict four-way meetings,"' or where a
case which appears unsuitable for collaboration, perhaps because of
a history of domestic abuse or violence or years of mistrust and
deception, is introduced to the process by lawyers eager for a new
collaborative case.
V. CONCLUSIONS
In order to achieve systemic change, it is not enough to change
the structure of conflict resolution processes, whether by mandatory
justice procedures such as settlement conferences or mediation, or
even where lawyers themselves develop and promote new settlement-
oriented processes. Neither is it feasible to wait for the legal
profession to transform itself. There is a need for civil justice reform
to at least begin the process of underlying change in norms and
values and start to nurture alternative models of skillful practice. The
100. Macfarlane, Culture Change, supra note 6, at 306.
101. Macfarlane, Emerging Phenomenon, supra note 3. A number of clients in
that study commented that their lawyers seemed to underestimate the level of
emotionality that would inevitably color the negotiation process between
themselves and their spouse. Sometimes, clients experienced this condition as the
lawyer's denial of their feelings in an attempt to impose a false "harmony" on the
situation. One client recalled:
Emotionally, it is very difficult. The real danger is that they [lawyers]
deal with people in an emotionally dangerous time.... The lawyers are
encouraging the expression of emotions. So we both do. But they are not
psychologists! They encourage the expression of emotion but they don't
know how to deal with it.
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procedural innovations of the last twenty years have demonstrated
that these changes can make a difference, but that there are many
environmental and cultural limitations. The question is, how do we
now maximize and extend the difference that procedural changes can
make?
We should take with us into our continuing efforts at civil justice
reform a healthy realism about the efficacy of these efforts for change
and look for ways to support them, both institutionally and culturally.
These include cultivating effective professional leadership by key
4i.res in the bench and b., and looking for their support to ensure
the exposure of as many lawyers as possible to settlement processes
in order to broaden their experience and expertise. When designing
institutional programs, we should consider the introduction of looser
controls over some aspects of mandatory processes in order to give
responsibility back to counsel and encourage lawyers to "buy in" and
take responsibility. Some critical "threshold" aspects of settlement
preparation (for example, documentary exchange), should be more
strictly regulated. We should also focus on the design features of
processes that maximize the potential for change (for example, the
explicit inclusion of clients). In legal education programs, we should
approach the clarification of counsel's role as an advocate in
settlement processes with a new and serious vigor. These programs
should also take every opportunity to showcase the transformation
stories of counsel participating in both institutional and private
settings who have found settlement advocacy to be an essential, and
self-fulfilling, dimension of legal practice. The theme that runs
through these lessons for building on procedural reform to create
systemic change is a simple one: the legitimation of legal practice as
conflict resolution.
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